

Monograph 01/2005

Socio-Economic Base of Political Dynamics in Madhya Pradesh

SHAIBAL GUPTA



Asian Development Research Institute

Monograph 01/2005

Socio-Economic Base of Political Dynamics in Madhya Pradesh

SHAIBAL GUPTA



Asian Development Research Institute

©Copyright
Author

Publisher

Asian Development Research Institute (ADRI)

BSIDC Colony, Off Boring-Patliputra Road

Patna - 800 013 (BIHAR)

Phone : 0612-2265649

Fax : 0612-2267102

E-mail : adri_patna@hotmail.com

Website : www.adriindia.org

Printed by

The Offsetters (India) Private Limited

Chhajjubagh, Patna-800001

Disclaimer

This monograph may not reflect the views held by the Asian Development Research Institute (ADRI) or any of its sister concerns. Usual disclaimers apply.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE OF POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN MADHYA PRADESH*

Introduction

Almost two decades ago in 1983, Phoolan Devi,¹ the ‘bandit queen’ of subaltern social stock, surrendered before the authorities of law epitomized by then Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Arjun Singh², before the cheering crowds of lower backwards. One of the conditions of her surrender was that all criminal cases pending against her should be tried in Madhya Pradesh rather than in Uttar Pradesh, the major area of her activities, then under the Chief Ministership of V.P. Singh³. History is now being repeated — recently, in an interview in the electronic media from his hiding, Rambabu Gaderia⁴, one of the notorious bandits from lower backwards in Madhya Pradesh expressed the possibility of surrender to the authorities of law, an euphemism for Mulayam Singh Yadav in Uttar Pradesh, rather than the state of his criminal operation. Apart from the striking similarity between the two high profiled bandits, the Chief Minister of both the states, in two different time periods, also belonged to the same social stock. In the earlier instance of Arjun Singh and V.P. Singh, both had flirted with egalitarian ethos, one adhering to socialism and other with *sarvodaya*. Thus the strategy of social inclusion of the marginalised, which could facilitate electoral dividend, was pursued differently in the two states. In the case of V.P. Singh, he could not absorb the political cataclysm in the aftermath of Behmai massacre⁵ or later the assassination of his brother, a high court judge, by the dacoits. In the Uttar Pradesh Legislature, it was derisively mentioned that dacoits have no confidence in the state police. In reply, the then Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Ammar Razvi proudly replied that “if criminals have faith in the police force of another state, it is a sad reflection on the integrity of that force”⁶, thus displaying innocence and somewhat contempt about the delicate and unconventional strategy of subaltern incorporation. When V.P. Singh resigned, it was less of an ascetic gesture and more of a counter revolutionary social measure of an upper caste elite. Since then, India’s middle class has engrossed itself in the national pastime on ‘law and order’, because it could not tolerate the rebellious subaltern upsurge and banditry was

*This paper is an outcome of London School of Economics – ADRI collaborative study on ‘Globalisation and Reforms in Governance : A Comparative Study of Two Hindi-Heartland States of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar’. The author is thankful to Professor John Harriss and Professor James Putzel of LSE and Dr. PP Ghosh and Rakesh Chaubey of ADRI for their comments on the earlier drafts of this paper.

one of its form. In contrast, Arjun Singh's initiative to organize the surrender of bandits belonging mostly of the lower castes or appointment of Mahajan Commission⁷ for reservation of the backwards indicated a proactive strategy of inclusion of the subaltern. History has changed substantially since then and the reluctance of the lower caste bandits to be tried in Madhya Pradesh and instead opt for Uttar Pradesh, even though Chief Minister of both the states, Mulayam Singh Yadav⁸ and Babu Lall Gaur⁹, belong to the same upper backward caste, indicate a radical shift in its course. While a 'Yadav' at the helm of two important states of the Hindi Heartland, indicates the paradigm shift in the post Mandal era,¹⁰ yet the authentic inclusion of the subaltern in the two states had followed different political roadmap.

What accounts for this radical turnaround in the political perception of the state of Madhya Pradesh among the subaltern masses in a matter of just over two decades? Moreover, in view of the intensive programmes launched by the state government during the 1990s for the upliftment of the weaker and marginalized sections in the state, such a drastic change in the perception of the lower caste-classes about the 'reforming state' under Digvijay Singh merits explanation. During the 1980s, the initiative of Arjun Singh gave a strong indication that Madhya Pradesh was emerging as perhaps the only state in the Indian union, taking on the mantle of a state-sponsored social reforms by stoking the aspirations of the backward and marginalized sections of the population. His efforts assume importance because of the fact that it preceded the self-initiated upsurge of the backward castes in the Indian politics. There were other states that followed suit, but primarily after the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report and after they started facing the heat of pressure from below. Madhya Pradesh, on the other hand, both in the 1980s and in 1990s, had not faced any such pressure from below and yet the state thought it prudent to initiate measures for empowering the poor and the marginalized. Thus when Arjun Singh had walked out in protest in 1993 when his own political protégée, Digvijay Singh, the then President of the state party, got elected instead of Subhash Yadav,¹¹ the emerging middle caste leader of the province, he was acting more in the mould of a reforming elite rather than acceding to any political pressure from below. It will be better to leave in the realm of speculation whether Arjun's move was narrow factional action or political statesmanship for social inclusion. Nevertheless, when he opted for the latter strategy, it could not have indicated only his personal predilection. Possibly, the Congress Party was taking belated cognizance of the upward mobility of the politically deprived after the rise of Laloo Prasad¹² in Bihar and emergence of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati¹³ in Uttar Pradesh. Any form of social

churning there was certain to have its direct effect on Madhya Pradesh. In the nineties, for the first time since independence, the Congress Party had to cope with the twin absence of a charismatic leader and a cohesive social agenda to face the elections. Arjun Singh's strategy to promote Subhash Yadav was a counter move of 'real politic' to resurrect the depleting base of the Congress Party in the Hindi Heartland. Gone were those days when the inclusion of the backward classes, specially its upper crest, could be ensured merely by wavering user charges for state services on a variety of items including electricity.¹⁴ With low water table, the power subsidy in Madhya Pradesh was considerable. After continuation of this policy for almost two decades, the state subsidy was no longer a sufficient sop to barter votes of the upper backwards or the agro-capitalist. They possibly wanted to be in the center stage of power.

Neither Arjun Singh who favoured a more overt policy by promoting a leader of the backward social stock to the post of Chief Minister, nor Digvijay Singh who continued the policy of social engineering through the more covert means of institutional reforms, were being too radical when they advocated the policy of social engineering. The Congress Party in the state had already established for itself a radical image on the issue of the abolition of the Privy purses¹⁵ of the erstwhile Indian princes way back in the late sixties. Although the abolition of the Privy purses had national significance, the issue had a major significance for Madhya Pradesh. In addition to the 'semi-sovereign rulers' (subordinate to no other princes) like those of the rulers of Gwalior, Indore, Dhar and Dewas, there were various levels of smaller Rajput chiefdoms classified officially as 'mediatised states' and the smaller ones described as 'guaranteed estates'. Some of these states — notably, Holkars of Indore and the Scindias of Gwalior — had pursued policies encouraging industry in their states and they probably enjoyed some reputation. But, the chiefdoms in general were of feudal nature. A drastic change in their legal position was thus nothing short of a revolutionary measure, as it also marked the official end of age-old patron-client ties. Quite expectedly, most of the princes switched their loyalty to the Jana Sangh in the ensuing political battle. During the struggle that followed, the Congress party portrayed "itself as a radical socialist party seeking an electoral mandate against the forces of reaction".¹⁶ The unprecedented desertion, especially of the lower caste-classes, from the Congress party during the last assembly elections, thus stands in stark contrast to the historically constructed "heritage of a radical social image and social linkages with the lower strata" in Madhya Pradesh.¹⁷

Equally interesting has been the change in the social base of the only other political party of note in Madhya Pradesh, the BJP. Its previous form, the Jana Sangh, till the sixties, was engaged more in defending the 'Fundamental Rights' of the Princes whose overwhelming presence in their ranks was always used by the Congress to its advantage during the elections.¹⁸ Not only in terms of class but also in sociological terms the party was clearly identifiable with the upper castes. Although, the social base of BJP was largely sustained by the Brahmins and the Baniyas at the national plane, but over a period of time, it could not escape the political upsurge among the upper backwards,¹⁹ leading to the installation of Kalyan Singh as the BJP Chief Minister in Uttar Pradesh. However, the strong hold of the upper castes in the Madhya Pradesh BJP meant that the odd leaders belonging to the backward social stock in its ranks preferred to display a 'Brahmin mentality' and "refrained from appearing as spokesman for their social category".²⁰ By the time of the last assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh, the BJP taking advantage of the absence of authentic democratization of the polity and the simmering discontent among the low castes, BJP projected Uma Bharti²¹ at the helm, ensuring an 'organic' leader of the backward castes for the state which proved to be a clinching electoral proposition. By installing Babu Lall Gaur as her successor, they indicated that they did not want to upset the social applecart that they have weaved so assiduously with Uma Bharti at the helm. But Gaur is no Uma Bharti; while the latter has been unequivocal in her criticism of the upper caste hold over the BJP, Gaur's evolution as a politician of note in the state BJP has been more in the mould of 'Sanskritists' within the party. So immersed he had been in the traditionalist mould of the Sangh ideology that at one stage he had questioned the policy of reservations for the backward castes on the ground that it would lead to a fragmentation of the Hindu society.²² Though, the favour shown to Babulal Gaur during the change of guard in Madhya Pradesh during the current BJP regime, remains confined within politicians belonging to the backward social stock, it reflects the latent dilemma within the larger social base of the party, a feature common to the majority of the traditional elites cutting across the political boundary, viz., they are willing to accommodate the lower castes but they want to achieve it without losing power.

In the context of the overwhelming dominance of the upper castes in the Madhya Pradesh polity in general and the successive quest of the elites to expand their social base by the inclusion of the marginalized, it brings us to the central question of whether the state initiated reforms at the behest of traditional elites can be a substitute for social mobilization

among the masses for empowerment. Answer to this as well as to other related questions on the current political scenario can be gauged only by looking at the specific features of the socio-economic context of the evolution of political process in Madhya Pradesh.

Material and Social Milieu of the Region

The sprawling state of Madhya Pradesh came into being in 1956 on the basis of the recommendation of the States Reorganisation Commission Report. Before the reorganization, it was known as Central Provinces. In 1918, the province comprised three territories brought together with little regard for their social and economic affinities.²³ Later, both Nagpur and Berar were taken out from the Central Provinces. The constituent part of Madhya Pradesh, till its vivisection in 2000 were (1) Madhya Bharat, a union of states in the Malwa Plateau region, (2) Vindhya Pradesh, a union of states in the Vindhya mountain region, (3) Bhopal, a centrally administered princely state, and (4) Hindi-speaking portion of the Central Provinces plus the previously amalgamated Hindi speaking states of Chhattisgarh.²⁴ “In reorganising what is now Madhya Pradesh”,²⁵ a political commentator maintains, “all administrative, financial and political principles were ignored In short, Madhya Pradesh today is a collection of left-out portion of different states combined into one heterogeneous unit”²⁶. The preponderant presence of the Princely States, each existing independent of the other, only heightened the sense of complete fragmentation in the region.

Unlike in the Gangetic belt, the concentration of habitation is limited in Madhya Pradesh. Apart from Malwa, agriculture was not very developed throughout the state. The situation more or less prevailed till the 1970s when the ‘Yellow Revolution’ started changing the fortunes of at least the middle and rich section of the agriculturists in the Gwalior-Chambal region. Historically, the foray of the Britishers during the colonial period was delayed in the region because of the absence of developed productive forces. Over and above, the phalanx of Princely states also acted as deterrent for Britishers to establish direct administrative hegemony. However, once saddled, they resorted to massive economic exploitation of its large forest resources. Apart from the forest, the Central India was also home of massive mineral reserve. Its exploitation was mediated through one of the worst labour conditions. The commercialization of agriculture, apart from ensuring enhanced land revenue for the colonial rulers, also entailed further alienation of the tribals from land. In the absence of indigenous incentive structure²⁷ or only local agro-entrepreneur, they followed the Marathas and “brought in Kunbi Patidars and Jat farmers from Gujarat and Rajasthan respectively and

settled them on the tribal land.”²⁸ This possibly explains the absence of a cohesive social settlement in the state as it is witnessed historically in the Gangetic or other riverine civilizations.

The key factor determining the incentive structure in agrarian society is the land tenure system. Essentially, this determines the right of collection of land rent, the most important source of revenue for the state before independence. There were several types of land revenue systems adopted by the British in the sub-continent. But broadly, there were two categories — one with intermediaries between the tenant and the state and the other operated directly between the state and the tenant. As British entry was late in this area, the introduction of the tenurial system with colonial imprint was delayed. However, once it happened, numerous types of tenurial relations were introduced over and above the exiting ones in Madhya Pradesh. In spite of different kinds of tenurial arrangements, the basic position of the tenant-cultivator in Madhya Pradesh during the colonial period remained miserable.²⁹ As Madhya Pradesh was thinly populated and unable to generate surplus, the landowning class there was not interested in the pro-active collection of rents like in the Permanent Settled areas. Hence, there was no real basis for rent and there was, in effect, a system of *Ryotwari* being practiced with a direct relation prevailing between the state and the peasants. “This explains why there was no massive dislocation on land and it was really indebtedness”³⁰ resulting from lack of productivity, “that lay behind the problems of its alienation and wastage”.³¹ Unlike in the Permanent Settled area, there was no substantive large-scale peasant movement in Madhya Pradesh for land reforms, either in the pre or post-independent period.³² In this context, the oft-repeated assertion that if there was no peasant movement in Madhya Pradesh, it was primarily because of the absence of large scale exploitation as witnessed in the Permanent Settlement areas, needs clarification. True, the poor peasants in the state escaped the large-scale violence and atrocities, but it was not because of the benevolence of the landed gentry of the region, but more because the mode of production there was relatively free of exploitative elements as found in the Permanent Settled areas. However, whenever the occasion arose the landed gentry of the region always thrived in re-inventing the semi-feudal ties with the poor peasantry. This was particularly evident in the political contestations which for many years were considered as the natural domain of the upper castes and other landed gentry, with the subaltern groups’ content in siding with one faction or the other. Thus, the absence of patron-client ties in Madhya Pradesh, as it existed between the mass of the toiling peasants and the landowning gentry in

the Permanent Settlement areas, in no way imply the prevalence of free peasantry. If anything, the absence of intensive agricultural activities in vast tracts of the region precluded the possibility of social mobility and also subjected the masses to a process of complete subordination, in the context of a largely static agrarian society. This, more than anything else, explains the absence of widespread frictions within the peasant society at large without negating the existence of relations of dominance and subjugation.

In the absence of pressure from below and the state sponsored effort from above for much of the post-independent period, the implementation of tenurial reform in Madhya Pradesh was lacking. The Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Land Cultivation Act, 1960, Madhya Pradesh Land Cultivation Act, 1974 and M.P. Consolidation of Holding Rules 1959 have not been decisively implemented. This has resulted into continued hold of “the forward caste (the Thakurs and the Brahmins) together with few other castes like Yadavs controlling a large share of the land.....”³³ Thus, when Digvijay Singh did try to implement the various policies enunciated in the Bhopal Declaration, also known as the Dalit Agenda,³⁴ specially those envisaging land distribution in favour of the Dalits³⁵, it met with maximum opposition, both within the party and outside. The interests of the emerging agro-capitalist, mainly the upper backwards, came in violent conflict with the Dalits. Incidentally, the massacre of Gujars,³⁶ the important upper backward agro-capitalists in the fertile Chambal area by Rambabu Gaderia indicates the endemic caste and class divide, resulting from uneven land distribution.

Data from the 1931 Census assembled by Jaffrelot³⁷ shows that Upper Castes made up 18.5 percent of the population of Madhya Bharat (including 6.5% Brahmins, 9% Rajputs and 2.2% Baniyas); 20.6% of the population of Vindhya Pradesh (13.3% Brahmins, 4.5% Rajputs and 2.1% Baniyas), and 11.7% of that of Mahakoshal (4.6% Brahmins, 5.5% Rajputs, and 1% Baniyas). The upper castes, especially the Brahmins, are more numerous in Madhya Pradesh than in most of the country. At the same time, the number of higher ranking middle castes are very small — less than one per cent of the population in Madhya Bharat and Vindhya Pradesh, 2.9%, mainly Kunbis, in Mahakoshal; and the lower ranking middle castes, now classified as OBCs, though numerous, include large numbers of distinct caste groups. Only the Ahirs attained numbers approaching 5 per cent of the total population in 1931 (6% in Vindhya Pradesh, 4.8% in Mahakoshal); Kurmis made up 4.7% of the population of Vindhya Pradesh, Lodhis 4.4% of the population of Mahakoshal. Just as the high proportion

of upper castes is a striking feature of the population of Madhya Pradesh, so is the absence of both a widespread and numerous middle-ranking castes (like the Kammas and Reddys of Andhra Pradesh, the Patels in Gujarat, or Yadavs in Bihar). Scheduled castes are less numerous across the state as a whole than Scheduled tribes (who were 14.7% of the population of Madhya Bharat in 1981, 20.2% of that of Vindhya Pradesh and 27.1% of that of Mahakoshal). Even after bifurcation, Scheduled Tribes make up about one fifth of the population of the state as a whole. This is the third striking feature of the social/caste structure of Madhya Pradesh. These basic features — the large numbers of upper castes, especially Brahmins, the absence of ‘dominant’ middle ranking castes with widespread influence, or of a numerous OBC caste community, and the large numbers of STs — are fundamental social parameters of the politics of MP.³⁸

Emergence and Main Characteristics of Political Elites of the Region

In the above section, we saw that the material milieu of the region of Madhya Pradesh is characterized by a complete absence of coherence in its different parts. The agrarian scene, though relatively conflict free, has been historically dominated by the upper castes and a miniscule number of middle castes, while the condition of the rest of the population was no different from their counterparts in other places in the Hindi heartland where more oppressive land tenure systems prevailed. This, together with the specific features of the social organization of the backward castes-classes, had a definite imprint on the characteristics and composition of the elites that emerged in the region. This is extremely important in understanding the political dynamics as it determines the extent of ownership by the governing elite of a given state, so necessary for the success of any programme. The process of creation of the state entailed that there was little in common among the elites coming from the different regions of the state. Mahakoshal was oriented towards Nagpur; the southern part of Malwa around Indore towards Gujarat and Bombay; Vindhya Pradesh towards Allahabad and southern Uttar Pradesh. Thus when Wilcox was writing more than thirty years ago, he thought that the political life of the state at that time was powered by regionalism and by conflict between Brahmins and Banias.³⁹ The state bourgeoisie, thus, lacked a ‘Madhya Pradesh’ identity. For the region, it meant that there was little sense of ‘ownership’ among the governing elite for the various programmes for the development of the state. It was not surprising that, when Chhattisgarh was taken out from Madhya Pradesh in 2000, there was no clamour of protest, indicating lack of subnationalism in the state. In the above light, the institution of *Bharat Bhawan* can be seen as the first major organised

effort for bringing cultural unity in a region which otherwise had hardly any regional identity. This institution was perhaps established to compensate for the 'absence of a common past' and thereby unite several layers of micro-identities by injecting a sense of competition with national identities, hoping that a provincial identity would emerge in the process.⁴⁰ However, the attempt had only limited impact.

Additionally, as long as Nagpur was the capital of the Central Province and Berar, the social currents of Western India dominated the state. It was in fact in the ideological catchment area of the Bombay Presidency. However, the 'incentive' embedded in anti-Brahmin movement in Maharashtra which triggered movement for sugar cooperative, had less sway in Madhya Pradesh than the politico-religious revivalism of Nagpur-based RSS.⁴¹ This variant of social upsurge had a natural constituency amongst the traders and moneylenders who, because of the inaccessible terrain of central India and near absence of the European traders, had a very powerful presence. "The indigenous trading classes could also count to some extent on the patronage of the native principalities. The merchants of Ahmedabad and Baroda also had a share of the profits of the opium trade which was known as the Malwa trade, though these profits were probably much smaller than those that were made from the trade that passed through Bombay".⁴² Being very far from the coastal region or anti-Brahmin social enlightenment and with returns from trade and usury being very high, the incentive for industries did not exist. In any case, the industrial establishments located in the south and western India were not isolated profit centers, but a proof of successful conclusion of societal efforts as well, mediated through many social or regional movements. Madhya Pradesh, in its previous incarnation as Central Province and Berar state, lacked cohesive identifiable social group or regional identity to clamour for industrialization. The industrialisation in Indore⁴³ has more to do with its contiguity with the developed economic enclave of western India, rather than the result of indigenous entrepreneurial effort. Thus trading interest groups were powerful in Madhya Pradesh and controlled its politics, both of Congress and BJP, to a considerable extent. Apart from the scions of the Princely states, the trading groups of Malwa have for long dominated politics in Madhya Pradesh.

The continued hold of the scions of the Princely States in the post-independence politics of Madhya Pradesh can only be understood in terms of the role they have played historically in their respective regions. Historically speaking, they were fulcrums of industrialization. The incentive structure was imbedded in the 'ownership' of the respective domain. Unlike the

landlords of the Permanent Settlement areas who were only interested in collection of rents, they (the Princes) had full sense of 'ownership' of their respective principalities. This in turn developed an inbuilt incentive structure for development. Parallel to the efforts of industrialization by Mysore, Travancore-Cochin and Gaekwad states, the Scindias of Gwalior or Holkars of Indore, two mega principalities of Madhya Pradesh, also set up state enterprises and helped Indian capitalists to establish factories within their territories.⁴⁴ "The political separateness of the native states from British India was more important for industrial growth than the semi-feudal structure of administration within many of those states, given the discrimination practiced against Indian businessmen under the imperial system".⁴⁵ Even Princely state of Bhopal played a decisive role in modernization and urbanization. Not only Bhopal was known as 'Baghdad of India' because of its rich Muslim culture, its tradition of tolerance and the progressive nature of its institutions had also ensured its distinguished place in the country's history. After independence, Bhopal was one of the few enlightened centers to be promoted as a capital of the sprawling state of Madhya Pradesh. Incidentally, most of the economically developed and better-governed regions of Madhya Pradesh were from the Princely states, not from the areas under the tutelage of British India. Thus, in spite of feudal structure and the absence of even a modicum of democracy, the Princes were generally not object of derision or revulsion in Madhya Pradesh, as intermediaries were in Bihar.⁴⁶ It was not surprising that after the introduction of the parliamentary democracy, Princes in Madhya Pradesh could win many elections, but in contrast, most of the Zamindars in the Bihar plain were routed in the elections whenever they opted for it.

Apart from the above elements that broadly constituted the 'traditional' elites of the state, the last two decades have seen the emergence of new social groups getting representation in its political structure. Initially, the process started primarily in response to the limitations of the narrow social base of the traditional elites that came in the way of maintaining political hegemony. A process of democratisation was attempted after Arjun Singh assumed the Chief Ministership. To expand the social base of the Congress Party, he tried to build bridges with the backward castes. Appointment of Mahajan Commission in 1981 to establish a list of the backward castes and to identity their needs was the first attempt in that direction. Mahajan Commission Report, however, could not create a social stir in the way similar Commissions (earlier Mungeri Lall⁴⁷ and later Mandal) did in Bihar. It was a piece of social engineering where the 'supply' preceded the 'demand' creation. However, all these

did help in ‘stoking the political consciousness of the’⁴⁸ upper backwards, having reverberations in the political sphere. The representation of OBC MLAs in the Madhya Pradesh assembly went up during this period, promoting further significant changes in the social composition of the state government. However, as Jaffrelot has noted, “the trend was not linear because it largely depended on which party was in the office”. While the successive Congress governments had a larger representation of OBCs and Schedule Tribes, the 1990 BJP Cabinet had a strong representation of the Upper Castes.⁴⁹ However, unlike in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where the emergence of upper backwards and other leaders belonging to lower caste-classes is based on an unprecedented rise of political aspirations among these groups, most of these leaders in Madhya Pradesh have rose to prominence by their co-option in either Congress or BJP politics and are rarely products of social movements within these caste-classes.

State, Reforms and the Recent Political Dynamics

1990s mark a crucial phase in the history of Indian state and politics. The reform and liberalization ushered during this decade clearly distinguishes it from the earlier period in post-Independent India. When the Congress Party was voted back in power in 1991, the reform process initiated during the eighties was strengthened. Unlike the Nehruvian dream of the state directing from the commanding heights ⁵⁰, Manmohan Singh ⁵¹, the then Finance Minister, sought to redefine the relationship between the state and the market. Accordingly, he emphasized the need for a reorientation of the role of the state to maximize its development impact ⁵². When BJP came to power later, it reiterated the agenda of dismantling of the state. While India started responding to the reform, it led to increasing duality in the economy. This entailed that certain sector of the economy leapfrogged, while the others either stagnated or even regressed. The unevenness in the impact of the reforms was also witnessed in terms of development opportunities that arose for different regions. While already better-endowed regions showed signs of growth, the ones with poor track record further slipped in the morass of backwardness. The public investment, both in industry and agriculture declined ⁵³. Most importantly, the gradual weakening and withdrawal of the state that the reform and liberalization regime entailed, seriously impinged upon the state’s role as a ‘provider’, largely the policies designed for the upliftment of the weaker and the marginalized sections. In the post independent period, the state has been able to perform this task primarily through its ability to implement the policy of positive discrimination. Apart from providing the aura of a ‘giver’, an important tool in

the electoral politics, the politics of state patronage also provide immense possibility of rent seeking and buccaneering accumulation. The whole range of reform - involving deregulation, decentralization or dismantling of the state that has brought major structural change in the Indian economy – meant that, its traditional role in the social sector has been significantly altered. However, its proper understanding including its likely political fallout is yet to get internalized in the body polity. In the absence of demystification of the state and its capacity for absorption, the competition to enter into its sacred domain has not yet abated; rather it is still the principal preoccupation of positive discrimination and electoral strategies.

It is essentially in this larger backdrop of economic reforms and the gradual weakening of the state structure, that the regional level development in Madhya Pradesh in the post 1990s needs to be contextualised. Although it is safe to argue that Madhya Pradesh, “had grown slowly than the average in the 1980s, (it, however,) accelerated significantly in the 1990s”⁵⁴, mainly because of being part of the backward states enclave of the Hindi heartland, it failed to attract domestic investment, foreign investment being more difficult. While commissioning first state level Human Development Report in Madhya Pradesh, the Digvijay Singh government did produce a provincial level benchmark and an agenda, but it underestimated the gravity of the public finance crisis, especially when the support from the central government was not very forthcoming. External resources also have its limit. Madhya Pradesh was assigned to the Asian Development Bank, having its own priorities. DFID (British Department for International Development) that gave full financial support to Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal turned down support to Madhya Pradesh’s Health Guarantee Scheme. With few exceptions, especially in the mining sector, no province in India could attract investment without indigenous strong economic foundation.⁵⁵ Being one of the laggard states, the depth, direction and debate needed for the strategy of reform was outside the cognitive world in the politics of Madhya Pradesh. Electoral politics there essentially revolved round ‘patronage’⁵⁶, a hallmark of an underdeveloped Hindi Heartland enclave which could be delivered only with the preponderant presence of the state.

When Digvijay Singh was elected the Chief Minister, he straightaway went for the backward caste consolidation primarily through an extension of the policy of positive discrimination. As most of the close observers of Madhya Pradesh in the 1990s would vouchsafe, the efforts of the Congress government under Digvijay Singh were not mere

rhetoric, since he actually implemented these policies. This probably explains his electoral success in the 1998 assembly elections, defying the anti-incumbency factor so strong in other states since the 1980's. Digvijay Singh did realize that positive discrimination that had benefited him or Arjun Singh earlier, would get negated with the increasing retreat of the state. With the increasing paradigm shift towards market in the wake of the reform, he further extended the principle of positive discrimination to the local market committees (Mandi Samiti) ⁵⁷ for regulating agricultural trade. He also tried to integrate the Dalit entrepreneurs in the market structure by ensuring certain items of state government purchase from them. Apparently, such efforts to integrate the policy of social engineering with market proved to be too feeble, because the size of market, in itself, is very limited in Madhya Pradesh. Decentralization was another major policy through which Digvijay Singh tried to offset the crisis in the public finance. ⁵⁸ Consequently, Madhya Pradesh became the first state to introduce the new Panchayati Raj system following the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments. Furthermore, the policy of social engineering was integrated with this institutional reform, when the MP *Panchayati Raj Act*, 1997 provided for 100 percent reservation at all levels of the Panchayati Raj three tier system. Even though Panchayati Raj did not bring forth absolutely new plebian social segment, it did create new alternative power centres. In so far as these policies were designed to defuse the demands of lower caste-classes for increased representation in the power structure, to the extent of demanding the post of Chief Minister, they were not sufficient as Digvijay Singh was to realize to his own peril later. However, together with the Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS) and other welfare measures introduced for the Schedule Tribes and the Schedule Castes, they made definite radical departure from the state initiated efforts of the past. The rationale for these welfare programmes were twofold — first, their target groups were the marginalized and, secondly, they could be organized at relatively lower scale depending upon the state's financial capacity. Thus Digvijay Singh gave salience to development issues that were essentially social but, in the process, he neglected the needs of a desired parallel process of economic development. Infrastructural development was very slow, hampering the expansion of the market and thereby progress on material front. It is not surprising then that the BJP was able to put Digvijay Singh on the defensive on his development track record, by harping on the poor quality of *bijli*, *sadak* and *paani* (electricity, road and water) in 2003 assembly elections avoiding the ethno-religious mobilization model adopted in Gujarat.

Moreover, the complete undermining of the party structure by the Congress Party in the post-Emergency period and the disapproval by the central leadership of any attempt by the individual leaders in the Congress to re-build the party structure meant that Digvijay Singh had to rely on the support system of the bureaucratic machinery and the civil society. Unfortunately, here also, in contrast to the general impression of 'good governance' during the period of Digvijay Singh, bureaucracy in Madhya Pradesh which was the main instrument of implementation of public policy, has two sides. "On one end of the spectrum is the image of a body working hard to infuse discipline into the working of institutions dominated by self-seeking politicians. On the other, it is a body novel in finding ways of corruption in spite of new constraints and devolution to politicians of many of the powers it enjoyed" ⁵⁹. Madhya Pradesh, being a copybook case of patronage democracy, the rent seeking was widespread here. A study that has attempted to quantify the extent of rent seeking in Madhya Pradesh argues, "Rough estimates suggest it takes about 15 percent of the total funds. These rents, combined with the shares that other fixers demand and the need to pay some shares in advance, can be enough to make a project infeasible."⁶⁰ Digvijay Singh also gave larger than life space to civil society organizations like Ekta Parishad ⁶¹ wedded to land rights or Narmada Bachao Andolan, dedicated to resist Narmada Complex of dams. By extending his government's support to these organizations that enjoyed the confidence of the subaltern masses, he was perhaps trying to match the mobilization done by RSS for the BJP. It is a different matter that Ekta Parishad's open support to Digvijay Singh in the 2003 assembly election could not make any difference.

In spite of trying hard, the efforts of the reforming Chief Minister failed to yield the desired result for him. The reasons are not too far to seek. Even though Digvijay Singh extended the policy of positive discrimination beyond Arjun Singh, his dismantling of the state continued unabated in response to the reform agenda and public finance crisis. ⁶² In the absence of any concerted effort to expand the economic opportunities for growth, combined with the limitations of the market in the region, the clamour to get a share of the decreasing capacity of the state endowment and resources intensified beyond the state's capacity of containment. Earlier, the state-centric development and electoral populism could go together but now, with the objective of dismantling of the commanding height, the political parties in India have found themselves constrained to rework these functions in the context of the demands imposed on the state order in the era of economic reform. This is the principal crisis that the state and its political conduit, the party system, are confronting now.

The manner in which the seemingly impregnable regime of Digvijay Singh fell is essentially an expression of this crisis. Additionally, the several reform measures initiated by the Digvijay Singh government had invariably an inbuilt tension that was bound to crop up sooner or later. In his policy of social engineering, which relied on weaving a ‘coalition of extremes’ — a coalition of Rajputs and the Schedule Tribes, as opposed to the Brahmin-Dalit combination of earlier period — many also saw an attempt to marginalize the numerically stronger section of the OBCs. The OBCs, though highly fragmented and dispersed in the state, constitute more than 40 percent of the state population. According to the figures presented by Jaffrelot ⁶³ as far back as the assembly election in 1998, the BJP was able to attract greater share of OBC votes. Moreover, the Dalit agenda introduced with much fanfare increased the distance of the OBC groups from the Congress Government. In majority of the cases, the land deed given to the members of the Dalit community was areas that till then were under the effective use of the members of OBC. While in few cases where the beneficiary was able to get the actual possession, invariably with the help of local administration, it has antagonized its de-facto owner, mostly the OBCs. On the other hand, in majority of the cases where the beneficiary failed to get possession of his piece, he became bitter about the existing regime. ⁶⁴ Further, with the advent of Bahujan Samaj Party in the state’s political scene, there has been a steady erosion of Congress share among the Dalit votes; this has been more pronounced in the Gwalior – Chambal divisions of the state. Even during the 2003 assembly election, the plummeting of the vote share of the Congress does not necessarily indicate gain for the BJP only. The decline of the Congress votes by 8 percent was accompanied by only 3.7 percent gain for the BJP. With the rest of the vote going to smaller parties, it perhaps indicates the beginning of a paradigm shift in what has been essentially bi-polar socio-politico configuration in Madhya Pradesh.

If the intention behind the decentralization scheme was to create new sources of social base for the state from among the subaltern masses, the creation of several foci of power in the Panchayati Raj structure proved to be a great undoing. While the social engineering attempted through the scheme did disturb the entrenched vested interest, the subsequent attempt of the state government to placate the established elite by introducing the ‘District Government’ in 2001, however, meant that the new social segments failed to assert their independence in the power structure. The legislatures and civil servants, who were marginalized after decentralization, greatly hastened the process of disempowering ⁶⁵ the local bodies of Panchayati Raj institutions. In the absence of a political party, Digvijay Singh lost an important chance to build an alternative information system and political

network. His electoral setback in the 2003 assembly election, among other things has also to be attributed to marginalisation of Panchayati Raj institutions, distancing the socially marginalized groups from the portals of grass-root power. The increasing marginalisation of the party structure and the absence of an ideological component which forced Digvijay Singh to rely on a 'techno-managerial' alternative system of delivery, proved that it could not be an effective instrument for political inclusion and democratization for the socially marginalised. A study ⁶⁶ related to Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) and Area Development Scheme (ADS) revealed that caste, class and influence still determine the distribution of funds rather than the much touted techno-managerial strategy of a couple of officers, even when they efficient. The study reveals: "While a forward or middle caste identity accompanied with an upper class position make a good case for inclusion among the beneficiaries, a scheduled caste identity is often an enough of a case for exclusion.... Lower castes can vote in numbers and sometime even access significant funds, but their low influence in other political spheres reduces their political bargaining power" ⁶⁷ That the cosmetic inclusion in the power hierarchy cannot be authentic is apparent by the functioning of the reserved seats in the Madhya Pradesh. The same study elaborates, "lower caste reserved seats can mean little when members are dominated by much more powerful politicians and interests in the panchayat body — working from within or outside it — particularly at block level." ⁶⁸ Further, because caste, contacts, capital and crime are the primary factors in determining political influence and voting behaviour, such democratisation becomes more of a politicization that works to exclude the poor." ⁶⁹

Conclusion

In Madhya Pradesh, it seems, there has never been any dearth of effort from the side of the ruling class for the inclusion of the marginalized social groups in the state structure. It was perhaps pursued more vigorously during the tenure of Arjun Singh and continued unabated during the period of Digvijay Singh. There, however, seems to be serious dearth of takers for such state-initiated reforms. The absence of any yearning among the marginalized in society, who could latch on to these reforms initiated at the behest of the state, merit serious consideration. One need to take a closer look at why the lower sections of the society in Madhya Pradesh is rather unprepared in utilising these state-initiated reforms to their advantage. Some answer to this could be gleaned from the composition of the political elites in the state of Madhya Pradesh. As argued above, in spite of the statutory prevalence of the *Ryotwari* settlement in Madhya Pradesh, the control of the Princes and their retainers —

mostly coming from the upper caste — on the agrarian society was as strong as that of the *zamindars* in the Permanent Settlement area. However, the investment in land being less remunerative, conflicts over questions of land rights never assumed any serious dimension in the state; in the process, it aborted a possible route that had facilitated the emergence of the backwards through participation in the socialist and *Kisan* movements in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The absence of a strong component of upper backwards in Madhya Pradesh also had far reaching consequences for the absence of any voice from below seeking representation in the power structure. Even amongst the dominant middle castes, the bulk constituting the upper strata within them have migrated from other states, thus aborting the possibility of a cohesive social network. As a result, the middle castes could seldom air their aspirations beyond the parameters set by the Congress and the Jan Sangh or later BJP. Admittedly, limitations of the backward caste upsurge in Madhya Pradesh notwithstanding, there has been a definite increase in the number of upper backward and *Dalit* political representatives, as Christophe Jaffrelot ⁷⁰ has shown; but since such increase has taken place under the broad canopy of upper caste-class dominance, the isolated leaders belonging to the backward caste-classes is of pliant nature. They are, in majority of the cases, result of a process that has been called by Myron Weiner ⁷¹ as an ‘open elite system’ instituted by the Congress party, both to meet the aspiring social groups to gain a share of power within the party and also to deal with party’s endemic factionalism. The emergence of the backward caste leaders in Madhya Pradesh within the broader parameters of the Congress and the BJP has, however, endowed them with one advantage; this pertains to their training in matters of governance perfectly in tune with the mainstream political ethos. It is not surprising then that Babulal Gaur and Digvijay Singh sound so similar in their utterances on vital policy matters and issues of governance.

Unlike in the initial years after independence when politics used to be around economic development and strengthening the democratic edifice of the state structure, electoral populism in recent years is the sole criterion for deciding the agenda. Since the eighties, mobilisation on the positive discrimination agenda or the ethno-religious issues has largely decided the public policies. In Madhya Pradesh, this strategy of positive discrimination has played a decisive role. The competition here involves raising the reservation quota by certain percentage to include or to exclude certain social groups from the state patronage. This dexterous manipulation has ensured electoral dividend to the ruling elite. The inclusion of the deprived in Madhya Pradesh was being attempted from above for electoral

considerations. This had ensured certain level of participation of the deprived, but it is far from the social paradigm shift that Bihar or even Uttar Pradesh has witnessed. But Madhya Pradesh has been different historically; even earlier, when a myriad of Hindu revivalist organisations ⁷² were threatening to storm the Congress bastion in Madhya Pradesh immediately after independence, the Kisan Sabha and powerful communist/socialist movement were threatening to script a new electoral history in Bihar. Thus inclusion or exclusion strategy depends on the array of social or political forces, which are ranged against the entrenched power. The political challenge in states like Madhya Pradesh is how can a state combine the strategy of provider/enabler with a market friendly economic strategy and yet retain electoral stability.⁷³ All this notwithstanding and in the context of the failure of the emergence of an authentic democratization process, can we see Rambabu Gaderia's desire to surrender outside Madhya Pradesh as a benchmark for socially excluded or does it exemplify the lack of 'reach' of the marginalized within the state 'system'?

References

1. (a) **Aujla, Angela**, “Caste as women: izzat and larai in Northern India” in www.peak.sfu.ca.
(b) Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Phoolan Devi”
2. Former Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh and present Union Minister of Human Resource Development, Government of India. Started his career as Socialist. Fought 1957 General Election in Assembly on PSP (Praja Socialist Party) tickets. Later joined Congress Party in 1960. As a Minister with plebian and socialist ethos, in the Madhya Pradesh cabinet, he ensured that Madhya Pradesh becomes the first state to give lease – hold rights upon plots and lands to urban slum dwellers; pioneered a special training and employment programme to improve the lot of the urban poor. Credited with the abolition of absentee ownership of cycle rickshaws.
3. V. P. Singh started his political career in student politics, later on he actively participated in Bhoodan movement (movement for donation of surplus land started by Vinoba Bhave) in 1957 and donated a well – established farm in village Pasma, District Allahabad. This enraged his family members to the extent of his wife going to the court alleging that he has gone insane and thus the donation should be declared null and void. Sanjay Gandhi as a part of a Congress strategy to extend the Dalit- Muslim-Brahmin coalition to Rajputs installed him as a Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Though he had resigned couple of months (July, 1982) before the surrender of Phoolan Devi, the upper caste hegemony that he symbolized remained intact. It is ironic that concern of the middle class for the ‘law’ and ‘order’ and backward upsurge in the Hindi Heartland coincides. V.P. Singh enmeshed their concern and overnight became their messiah. He enmeshed his image on this front to extend the fight on corruption in the defense purchases. Later on ironically, as a Prime Minister of India from December 1989 to November 1990, he was the architect of implementation of Mandal Commission, which ensured positive discrimination for the backwards (upper and lower) in the state structure. But the middle class felt let down after the implementation of the Mandal commission.
4. (a) IANS, “Chambal Sets another bloodbath”, Monday, November 1, 2004.
(b) Central Chronicle, “Castes rampant in Gaderia gang”, Saturday, March 26, 2005.
5. In the village of Behmai, in Uttar Pradesh, 22 high caste Rajputs were massacred in 1981. Phoolan Devi came to national and international attention, because she was attributed to commit this mayhem.
6. Sen, Mala, India’s Bandit Queen – True story of Phoolan Devi, HarperCollins Publishers India, New Delhi, 1993, page, 212.
7. A Commission was appointed named after its Chairman, Ramji Mahajan by then Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Arjun Singh to list backwards in the state and identify their needs.
8. The present Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, a product of Socialist movement and backward class/caste upsurge. He was influenced by the socialist thought of Ram Manohar Lohia.
9. He is the present Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, a Yadav by caste. Replaced Uma Bharti as the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Even though coming from the backward community, he had expressed his reservations about Mandal Commission. See **Christophe Jaffrelot**, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics, Permanent Black, New Delhi, 2003, Page 478.
10. Mandal era primarily connotes to the period following the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. This Report that provided for reservation for the backward castes in Government services also had far reaching implication on the politics of the country. An upsurge in the backward caste aspiration initiated a major change in the social composition of most of the political parties.
11. Beginning with being elected to the *mandi samitis* and the cooperative societies, Yadav soon graduated to the *Vidhan Sabha* and *Lok Sabha*. He simultaneously progressed up in the setup of the *mandis* and cooperative societies. When the Congress Party came to power in Madhya Pradesh in 1993 he became the deputy chief minister and also the chairman of the Madhya Pradesh Mandi Board. Presently he is leader of opposition in Madhya Pradesh Assembly.

12. Presently Railway Minister in the Union Cabinet of Dr. Man Mohan Singh. He and his wife Srimati. Rabri Devi had almost unbridled rule in Bihar between 1990 to 2005 assembly election in March. Credited with social paradigm shift in the state.
13. Former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, political heir of Kashi Ram, the foremost living Dalit leader of India.
14. The rise of the agro-capitalists section that also comprised a large section of the upper backwards, in the post Green Revolution period into political power ensured huge power subsidy. They consumed more and more electricity to irrigate second, third and fourth crops. They used their votes to resist efforts to collect user charge.
15. Privy Purses was the compensation package given to the erstwhile princes in lieu of the merger of their states in the Indian Union.
16. **Mitra, Subrata** in “Political Integration and party Competition in Madhya Pradesh : Congress and the opposition in Parliamentary Elections:1977-1984” in Diversity and Dominance in Indian Politics – Volume-I, **Sisson, Richard** and **Roy, Ramashray** Edited, Sage Publication, New Delhi,1990, Page 176.
17. Ibid. p.188.
18. Ibid. p.176.
19. **Jaffrelot**, op.cit. pp.462-491.
20. Ibid. p.477.
21. Selected by the BJP High Command to lead the party in the assembly election of 2003 in Madhya Pradesh. She was not only the militant Hindutva face of BJP but also symbol of incorporation of the upper backwards in the party hierarchy. Her stock within the party went high with the exit of Kalyan Singh, with huge social base amongst the backwards in Uttar Pradesh. But she had to quite the Chief Ministership for being charge sheeted in ten year old case, when she hoisted the national flag in an Idgah (a Muslim prayer ground) in Karnataka.
22. **Jaffrelot**, op.cit. p.477-478.
23. Two territories of Nagpur and Saugor-Nerbudda, united in 1861 to form the Central Provinces; and the division of Berar, leased from the Nizam of Hyderabad and annexed to the province in 1903. The territory of Nagpur was formerly the state of Nagpur, ruled by the Bhonsle kings, but annexed by the colonial administration to augment its economic resources and consolidate colonial power in Central India. The annexation of Berar, which strengthened the Marathi component of the Central Provinces, was similarly designed to solve an administrative problem. Berar was a fertile cotton growing area on the boundary of the province, with an annual revenue surplus. The revenue of the Central Provinces, by contrast, was barely enough to cover the cost of the administration and recurrent famines between 1896 and 1900 made governments’ financial position even more insecure. The famines thus made it incumbent upon the Government to give the province immediate financial aid, and to provide it with long term source of revenue by leasing Berar from the Nizam of Hyderabad and annexing it to the province in 1903.
24. Each of the constituent portions of the new state, except Bhopal, were themselves composite entities. The Madhya Bharat union, the Vindhya Pradesh union, and the Mahakoshal region had been created after independence. While the agitation for linguistic states and states reorganisation had been dominated by forces not important in the region (except for Vidarbha Region, the Marathi-speaking zone of the Central Provinces), the central government was forced to change political organisation in central India to conform to national patterns. What is important to note is that the state was not ‘created’ on the basis of an indigenous demand, and that its constituent units infact possessed almost no political affinity.
25. **Wilcox, Wayne** : “Madhya Pradesh”, In Myron Weiner”, State Politics in India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968, Page 32.
26. **Wilcox, Wayne**, ibid.
27. By ‘incentive structure’ we essentially mean an incentive embedded in the mode of production for enhanced productivity, mediated through the tenurial system. It primarily entails, that in a given mode of production, who has the right to appropriate the surplus production. In the *Ryotwari* areas this right was vested with the peasant producers, whereas, in the Permanent Settlement areas this right was with the intermediaries.

28. **Rahul**, Sahulkars Rule The Roost – Status of Informal Rural Financial Markets in Adibasi Dominated : Dominated Region of Western Madhya Pradesh (unpublished monograph).
29. **Roy, Dunu** “Land Reforms, People’s Movements and Protests”, in Land Reforms in India : Issues of Equity in Rural Madhya Pradesh, Volume 7, edited by **Praveen K. Jha**, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2002, page 34 – 35.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. p.49.
32. Ibid. p.47.
33. **Madhya Pradesh : State Report** — Panchayati Raj and Natural Resource Management : How to Decentralise Management over Natural Resources (Unpublished), page 80-81.
34. The dalit agenda known as the Bhopal document was prepared at the behest of then Chief Minister, Shri Digvijay Singh mainly to express his commitment to the issues of dalits. It is not a matter of pure coincidence that the timing of the report coincided with the growing popularity of BSP in Madhya Pradesh.
35. **The Bhopal Document: Charting a New Course For Dalits for the Twenty First Century**, Government Of Madhya Pradesh, p.109-113.
36. Central Chronicle, “Castes rampant in Gaderia gang”, Saturday, March 26, 2005.
37. **Christophe Jaffrelot**, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics : 1925 to the 1990s – Strategies of Identity – Building , Implantation and Mobilisation (With special reference to Central India), Viking, 1996.
38. **John Harriss**, Crisis States Programme note on ‘Politics and Society In Madhya Pradesh: Initial Observations, n.d.
39. **Wilcox, Wayne** : “Madhya Pradesh”, In Myron Weiner”, State Politics in India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968, Page 44.
40. Bharat Bhawan : Another Tragedy of Bhopal, published by Kamlesh on behalf of writers, intellectuals and artists. Delhi, 1991.
41. **Christophe Jaffrelot**, (1996), op.cit.
42. **Bagchi, Amiya Kumar**, Private Investment in India — 1900 – 1939, Orient Longman, Cambridge University Press, 1972, Page 202.
43. **Jones, Rodney W.**, Urban Politics in India : Area, Power, and Policy in a Penetrated System, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974.
44. **Bagchi, Amiya Kumar**, op.cit. Page 214.
45. **Bagchi, Amiya Kumar**, op.cit., Page 215.
46. (i) **Pouchepadass, Jacques** – Land, Power & Market : A Bihar District under Colonial Rule, 1860-1947, Sage Publication, New Delhi, 2000
- (ii) **Hill, Christopher V.** – River of Sorrow : Environment and Social Control in Riparian North India, 1770-1994. Association for Asian Studies, Inc. Monograph & occasional Paper Series, Number 55, 1997
- (iii) **Singer, Wendy** – Creating Histories : Oral Narratives and the Politics of History-Making, Oxford University Press, 1997.
47. Mungeri Lal Commission Report was implemented in Bihar during the tenure of Karpoori Thakur.
48. **Jaffrelot, Christophe**,(2003), op.cit., Page 435.
49. Ibid. p.358-360.
50. Selected works of Nehru, Vol. 2, Second Series, Volume Sixteen, Part II (Published by Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, Teen Murti Bhavan, New Delhi; distributed by OUP, New Delhi, 1994) Page 13-30.
51. **Singh, Manmohan** – ‘India : The Unfinished Agenda of Economic Reforms’, 28th Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture (November 13, 1996). Monograph, published by Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1996.

52. **Singh, Manmohan** – Ibid.
53. **Patnaik, Utsa**, “India’s Agricultural Development in the light of Historical Experience”, in *The State, Development Planning and Liberalisation in India*, OUP, 1997.
54. **Ahluwalia, Montek. Singh**, ‘State Level Performance under Economic Reforms in India’, in *Economic Policy, Reforms and the Indian Economy*, edited by Anne O.Kruggler, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, page 108.
55. (a) **Kennedy, Loraine**, “The political determinants of Reform Packaging : Contrasting Responses to Economic Liberalisation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu”, in *Regional Reflections : Comparing Politics Across India’s States*; edited by **Rob Jenkins**, OUP, New Delhi, 2004, page 33.
- (b) POSCO, the South Korean steel giant, recently entered into agreement with Orissa government to establish a steel plant to produce 12 million tones steel annually. This can turn out to be the biggest foreign direct investment to come to India.
56. Patronage here essentially means the extension of state largesse by those exercising power to their followers and retainers.
57. **Jaffrelot, Christophe** (2003), op.cit., page – 442.
58. Ibid. p.448.
59. **Singh, Vikash, Gehlot, Bupendra, Start, Daniel and Johnson, Craig** : *Local Politics and The Distribution of Development Funds – Case studies from Madhya Pradesh.*, Draft ODI, working, paper 2002., page 32.
60. Ibid. p.32.
61. Ekta Parishad is a frontal civil society organisation with a widespread area of operation in Madhya Pradesh. It mostly concentrates on issues of land rights, forests and water.
62. To keep the fiscal stabilization programme, not only there was freeze on promotions, non – payment of dearness allowance but also there was retrenchment of 28,000 daily employees. This had put 5 lakhs of class-II to IV not only on a warpath with then Congress Government but also became the main support to BJP in the assembly election.
63. **Jaffrelot**, (2003), p.448.
64. My own fieldwork mainly in the areas of Gwalior – Chambal divisions in 2003.
65. **Manor, James**, “The Congress defeat in Madhya Pradesh”, <http://www.india-seminar.com/2004/534%20james%manor.htm>., page - 3.
66. **Singh, Vikash, Gehlot, Bupendra, Start, Daniel and Johnson, Craig**, op.cit. page 30.
67. Ibid, page 30.
68. Ibid, page 31
69. Ibid, page 31.
70. **Jaffrelot, Christophe**, (2003), op.cit.
71. **Myron Weiner** *Party Building in a new Nation – The Indian National Congress*, University of Chicago Press, 1967.
72. **Jaffrelot**, (1996), op.cit.
73. With increasing problem of public finance, will it be possible for the state to be provider and yet win elections. BJP unfolded a clever strategy, to highlight to failure of ‘governance’, where it was not in the helm, whereas it may opt for Gujrat model of ethno-religious mobilisation, when it has to defend their track record of ‘governance’. This double edged sword will be a new political innovation. In any case it will be erroneous to state that ethno-religious mobilisation was not attempted in Madhya Pradesh is BJP. In fact the polarisation was already done through successful road-shows of *Dr. Togadia* led *Vishwa Hindu Parishad*. The polarised community further gave electoral death knell to Congress Party in Madhya Pradesh on the question of ‘governance’.



The Asian Development Research Institute (ADRI) Society was established and registered by a group of social scientists in 1991. The motivation for starting yet another Institute in Patna was not merely to expand social science research, but to lend it a distinct development orientation and deliver all research output to its potential users in a demystified form. In this research perspective, the broad objectives of ADRI Society are:

- ✎ to undertake academic research of direct relevance to development efforts made by an individual or a group or the community itself;
- ✎ to broaden the database of research as also of its end use by involving as many classes of persons and institutions as possible;
- ✎ to offer research results in a more innovative, demystified and useworthy form; and finally
- ✎ to restore man to his central position in social research in totality and with full dignity.